Daniel Gafford scored two points and collected three rebounds Wednesday. Dallas nevertheless outscored Houston by nine while he was on the floor. The Mavericks lost the game by eighteen.
Those numbers should slow anyone eager to assign the entire 128-110 defeat to the starting center. They also do not erase the much more consequential team number: Houston collected seventeen offensive rebounds, while Dallas collected eight.
The Rockets kept finding another opportunity after their initial shot. Dallas kept having to defend again. For a Mavericks team that finished with a respectable shooting percentage, the inability to complete enough defensive possessions was an expensive way to make the evening longer.
Gafford's individual line and his plus-minus describe different things. Two points and three rebounds were modest production. The plus-nine records what the team scored and conceded during his minutes, alongside whichever teammates and opponents shared the floor. It cannot isolate his defensive effect or establish that a different center would have produced a better team result.
Gafford attempted only one field goal and did not make it; his two points came from free throws. That limits what his low scoring total can tell us about Dallas's finishing opportunities. It describes a small return without explaining why the offense produced so few attempts for him.
Houston's rebounding had several contributors. Amen Thompson collected ten boards, including six at the offensive end. Alperen Sengun also had ten rebounds, with five coming on offense. Those two players alone account for a substantial portion of the second-chance work, which makes the problem wider than a simple comparison between starting centers.
For Dallas, ending a possession after a missed shot is a team requirement. The box score can identify who secured an offensive rebound; it cannot by itself assign every failed box-out or describe each player's responsibility. The practical conclusion is therefore collective: the Mavericks need to finish those trips, rather than assume the center owns every loose ball near the basket.
The shooting totals show why the extra opportunities mattered. Houston took 88 field-goal attempts and made 47. Dallas took 79 and made 41. Dallas's 51.9% conversion rate was good, but Houston combined a slightly higher 53.4% with more attempts. The Mavericks were asking efficiency to overcome an opponent receiving a larger supply of chances.
There was another way Dallas surrendered opportunities: 21 turnovers. That is a separate problem from allowing an offensive rebound, and the two totals should not be added as if they describe identical possessions. One concerns protecting the ball during Dallas's attack; the other concerns ending Houston's. Both belong in a fuller explanation of why shooting well did not keep the Mavericks close.
